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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Respondent, 
vs. 
MILO SIMONS, 
Defendant / Petitioner. 
Case No: 20110842-SC 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER / DEFENDANT UPON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
•kk-kk 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code § 
78A-3-102(5) upon writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1. In its order, this Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari as to the 
issue of "[w]hether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's denial of 
Petitioner's motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds." This issue presents two 
questions to be decided by the Court. First, is the decision of the Court of Appeals in 
conflict with Utah cases in so far as the court found the police did not "measurably 
extend the length of the traffic stop" when they ceased investigating the driver and 
approached Simons to ask him questions. State v. Simons, 2011 UT App 251, |^ 11, — 
P.3d -— (emphasis added). Second, is a passenger's detention, which is justified at its 
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inception by suspicion of the driver, impermissibly extended if, prior to the conclusion of 
the investigation of the driver, the police stop investigating the driver and divert their 
attention and investigation to question a passenger without reasonable suspicion that the 
passenger has committed a crime? In other words, can the police intentionally delay the 
conclusion of a justified detention, based on suspicion of the driver, in order to 
investigate into areas or persons not supported by reasonable suspicion on the basis that 
the further investigation technically occurs prior to the completion of the original justified 
detention. 
On certiorari, this Court "reviewfs] the decision of the court of appeals, not the 
decision of the trial court." Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 978 P.2d 460, 461 (Utah 
1999). The court of appeals' decision is reviewed for correctness. Harold Selman, Inc. v. 
Box Elder Cnty., 2011 UT 18, U 15, 251 P.3d 804. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Any controlling statutes are set forth in full in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Defendant, Milo Simons, appeals from the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals 
which affirmed the conviction, rulings, and orders of the Fourth District Court, 
Honorable James R. Taylor, where Simons was convicted on one count of possession of 
methamphetamine under UtafrOade § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). 
2 
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B. Trial Court and Court of Appeals Proceedings and Disposition 
Milo Simons was charged by information filed in Fourth District Court on October 
27, 2008 with possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code § 58-37a-5(l), and possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). R. 6-5. A preliminary hearing was held 
before the Honorable James R. Taylor on December 7, 2006 and Simons was bound over 
for trial. R. 18,92:29-30. 
On March 8, 2007 Simons filed a motion to suppress asserting evidence of 
possession in both counts was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution. R. 35-24. On April 
30, 2007 Judge Taylor denied the motion by written ruling. R. 49-46.l The trial court 
found that evidence of paraphernalia "coupled with the signs of possible impairment [of 
the driver] lead to a reasonable suspicion and concern about both occupants of the car." 
R. 47. "The tactics including... questioning Mr. Simons about drug possession or use, 
followed by a search of his person... [was] reasonably suggested by [the officer's] 
concerns." R. 47-46. 
On September 20, 2007 Simons entered a conditional plea to possession of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony. R. 69-67, 94: 3-8. On January 3, 2008 
Simons was sentenced to 36 months probation with 90 days in jail with credit for time 
served and a $950.00 fine. R. 90-88, 96: 6-8. 
f
 Simon's co-defendant, Kevin Sorensen, also filed a motion to suppress. Judge Taylor 
issued a single ruling denying the motion to suppress of each defendant. 
3 
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A notice of appeal was filed on January 31, 2008 in Fourth District Court. The 
Utah Court of Appeals, after reviewing briefs from Simons and the State of Utah, issued 
a memorandum decision on July 29, 2011 affirming the denial of Simon's motion to 
suppress.. State v. Simons, 2011 UT App 251. The Court of Appeals found that when the 
officers left the driver and approached Simons to ask "Simons if he had anything on his 
person that the officer should know about" the "question did not measurably extend the 
length of the traffic stop or render the overall duration of the stop unreasonable." Simons, 
2011 UT App 251, 1f 11 (emphasis added). The court found it "need not determine 
whether [the police's] questioning of Simons was supported by reasonable suspicion" as 
concluded by the trial court. Simons, 2011 UT App 251,^6. 
Simons filed his petition for writ of certiorari on September 26, 2011. On 
February 17, 2012 this Court granted Simons' petition and later ordered this brief be filed 
by April 9, 2012. The Court granted as to the issue of "[wjhether the court of appeals 
erred in affirming the district court's denial of Petitioner's motion to suppress evidence 
on Fourth Amendment grounds." 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Testimony from the December 7, 2006 preliminary hearing.2 
Deputy John Luke 
John Luke is a Deputy Sheriff who was on patrol on October 21, 2006 when he 
observed a vehicle speeding. He ran the license plate and found the vehicle was noted to 
2
 On December 7, 2006 the trial court held a joint preliminary hearing for Petitioner, Milo 
Simons, and his co-defendant, Kevin Sorenson. The motion to suppress was based on 
testimony taken at that hearing. 
4 
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be uninsured. R. 92: 3-4. Deputy Luke, and another officer he was training, made a 
traffic stop and made contact with the driver, Sorenson, and passenger, Simons. R. 92: 5. 
No video of the stop was recorded because, although Luke's patrol vehicle is equipped 
with a video camera, it was broken at the time. R. 92: 18. Simons was in the front 
passenger seat. R. 92: 5. The officer in training approached the driver's side and Luke 
observed from the rear passenger side of the vehicle, however, he could not hear what the 
other officer was saying or what questions were asked. R. 92: 20, 27. At that time Luke 
made no observations about the state of the driver or anything else suspicious. R. 92: 20. 
Luke and the other officer then met behind the suspect's vehicle, but in front of 
Luke's vehicle, and had a conversation. R. 92: 21, 28. The other officer made no 
mention of anything suspicious about Sorenson's condition, he merely handed Luke the 
driver's ID. R. 92: 21.3 Then Luke approached Sorenson on the driver's side to issue a 
citation. R. 92: 21. Luke "reapproached" and requested all of the relevant information. R. 
92: 22. Luke asked for proof of insurance and registration to which Sorenson replied the 
car was borrowed and he could not produce insurance information. R. 92: 5.4 Luke did 
not inquire about the speeding violation or about the possible lack of insurance. R. 92: 19. 
Deputy Luke noted signs of impairment in the driver including watery bloodshot 
eyes, rapid speech and movement, and unidentified yet suspicious body language. R. 92: 
Luke later admitted he did not remember if the driver provided a drivers license, 
identification, or just a name and date of birth. R. 92: 22. 
4
 Although Luke originally testified to asking these questions upon his approach of the 
vehicle, on cross-examination he admitted that he did not ask any questions but that it 
was the other officer who was being trained who asked the questions. R. 92: 20. Luke 
could not hear the conversation between Thomas and Sorenson. R. 92: 27. 
5 
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6, 22. While Luke returned to his vehicle to run a records check he observed Sorenson 
moving in an agitated manner, touching his mirror several times and moving his head. R. 
92: 6, 23. Luke described this behavior as unusual and possibly a sign of impairment. R. 
92: 6. 
After Luke returned to the vehicle Sorenson said, without prompting, "I'm not 
drunk," at which time Luke decided to remove Sorenson from the vehicle to check for 
impairment by conducting the field sobriety tests (FSTs). R. 92: 6, 22.5 Luke did not 
smell any odor of alcohol. R. 92: 22. His decision to take Sorenson from the vehicle to 
check for impairment was based upon the watery bloodshot eyes and his rapid 
movements. R. 92: 23. As the driver's door opened Luke "could see inside the door side 
compartment in plain view there were several baggies that had been chewed on." R. 92: 
6-7, 23. The baggies were down in the bottom of the door compartment. R. 92: 24. Luke 
could not see anything in the baggies until he retrieved them from the door. R. 92: 25. 
According to Deputy Luke, he has only seen these types of baggies used to carry drugs. 
R. 92: 8. Luke noted that there appeared to be a white powder residue inside the baggies, 
which Luke suspected was methamphetamine. R. 92: 8. Luke ended his DUI 
investigation without performing the FSTs. R. 92: 25, 26. At that point Sorenson was not 
placed under arrest because paraphernalia is "a charge that [the officers] would issue a 
citation for and release." R. 92: 26. 
It is unclear from Luke's testimony whether this statement came after Luke approached 
Sorenson the first time after speaking with the other officer in front of the patrol car or 
when Luke returned the second time after having run a records check. 
6 
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Rather than arrest Sorenson, issue a citation, or continue to investigate the DUI or 
paraphernalia, Deputy Luke left Sorenson with the other officer to "just stand by with Mr. 
Sorenson" and approached Simons and explained that he found paraphernalia in the car 
and asked Simons "if he had anything on his person [Luke] needed to know about." R. 
92: 9, 25. Simons answered that he had a pipe in his underwear. R. 92: 9. When Simons 
stepped out of the vehicle Luke made him shake the pipe out of his pants and it fell to the 
ground. R. 92: 9. According to Luke the glass pipe taken from Simons was a 
methamphetamine pipe. R. 92: 9. 
Deputy Thomas, the officer in training, searched Sorenson's jacket pocket and 
found a small sack containing $561 in cash and a bag of methamphetamine. R. 92: 10. 
After placing Sorenson under arrest Luke approached Simons. Simons then told Luke 
that he had some meth in his pocket and then removed a bag containing 
methamphetamine from a small pocket in his pants. R. 92: 12. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Simons asserts the court of appeals erred by finding that when Deputy Luke 
stopped investigating the driver and began questioning Simons he did not "measurably 
extend the length of the traffic stop or render the overall duration of the stop 
unreasonable." State v. Simons, 2011 UT App 251, j^ 11 {citing Arizona v. Johnson, 555 
U.S. 323, 129 S.Ct 781, 787-88, 172 L.Ed.2d 964 (2009)). Simons' assertion is based on 
the cases that demonstrate Utah does not recognize a de minimus exception to the rule 
that prohibits the police from extending a lawful detention beyond the bounds justified by 
7 
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reasonable suspicion. In fact, Deputy Luke's diversion did measurably extend the length 
of the stop at least as much as was found to be improper and measurable in State v. 
Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650, and similar to those found impermissible in State v. 
Baker, 2010 UT 18, 229 P.3d 650, and State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446 (Utah 1996). 
If this Court concludes the court of appeals erred by affirming the trial court's 
denial of Simons' motion to suppress this case should be remanded with an order 
allowing Simons to withdraw his plea and an order suppressing the evidence obtained 
from the illegal detention. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DISTRICT 
COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Relevant Law 
Cases from the United States Supreme Court, and cases from this Court are 
presented here to give a description of Fourth Amendment law as it applies to 
investigative detentions, automobile stops, and detention of drivers and passengers based 
on reasonable suspicion of traffic and other related offenses. 
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 4, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) the United 
States Supreme Court examined "serious questions concerning the role of the Fourth 
Amendment in the confrontation on the street between the citizen and the policeman 
investigating suspicious circumstances." A plain-clothes police officer was patrolling in 
downtown Cleveland and noticed two men standing on the street corner who "didn't look 
right to [the officer] at the time." Terry
 7 392 U.S. 1, 5. The officer observed the men 
8 
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from a distance and saw that they were looking in a store window suspiciously and 
pacing back and forth, the officer believed they were preparing to rob the store and was 
afraid they may have had a weapon. Terry, 392 U.S. at 6. The officer approached the 
men, asked their names, and then grabbed the defendant, spun him around and patted 
down the outside of his clothing, discovering a pistol. The officer then did the same to 
the other men, discovering another weapon and the two men were arrested and charged 
with carrying concealed weapons. 
The Court was urged to make new constitutional distinctions between "a 'stop' 
and an 'arrest'... and between a 'frisk and a 'search.'" Terry, at 11. The Court made 
several conclusions. First, the Court held that when the police stopped the defendant, 
"took hold of him and patted him down" he was seized and searched. Id., at 19. Next, the 
Court held that "[w]hen an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose 
suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to 
the officer or to others" the officer may "take necessary measures to determine whether 
the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm" but 
those measures "must be limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons 
which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby, and may realistically be 
characterized as something less than a 'full' search..." Id., at 24, 26. 
The Terry doctrine was applied to investigative detentions in automobiles in State 
v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1994), where the defendant was pulled over because 
the police believed he did not have a valid drivers license and because the officer 
observed a signal violation. At the traffic stop the defendant could not produce a valid 
9 
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drivers license but did provide an identification card, which resulted in the discovery of 
several arrest warrants. The defendant was arrested on those warrants and he was cited 
for the driving violations. An inventory search was conducted following the arrest where 
the police discovered cocaine. The defendant sought to suppress the cocaine alleging the 
police lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him in the first place and that the stop was 
merely a pretext stop. Lopez, at 1130. 
The relevant portion of the Court's opinion (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 
491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed. 2d 229 (1983)), was that "[o]nce a traffic stop is 
made, the detention 'must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate 
the purpose of the stop.'" Lopez, at 1132. The Court went on to say "[b]oth the "length 
and the scope of the detention must be 'strictly tied to and justified by1 the circumstances 
which rendered its initiation permissible." Lopez, at 1132 {quoting State v. Johnson, 805 
P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991). "This means that... once the driver has produced a valid 
driver's license and evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle, he must be allowed to 
proceed on his way, without being subjected to further delay by police for additional 
questioning." Id, at 1132 (quoting State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App 
1990)). And "[ijnvestigative questioning that further detains the driver must be 
supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity." Id. "If reasonable 
suspicion of more serious criminal activity does arise, the scope of the stop is still 
limited. The officers must 'diligently pursue a means of investigation that is likely to 
confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it [is] necessary to detain 
the defendant.'" Id., {quoting State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah App. 1991)). 
10 
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The Court found running a warrants check during the course of a routine traffic stop does 
not violate the Fourth Amendment, so long as it does not significantly extend the period 
of detention beyond that reasonably necessary to request a driver's license and valid 
registration and to issue a citation. Id., at 1133. 
In State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, 229 P.3d 650, this Court reviewed the decision of 
the court of appeals in a case where the defendant, a passenger of a vehicle pulled over 
for a traffic violation, challenged his detention and frisk. The defendant in Baker was a 
backseat passenger in a car that was stopped for an equipment violation. Baker, 2010 UT 
18, \ 3. The driver was arrested when the police discovered her license was suspended 
for a prior drug conviction. During the arrest, backup officers were interacting with the 
defendant and other passengers, one of which immediately advised the officers he had a 
knife and gave it to them. Baker, at \ 4. Then, upon request from the officers, the rest of 
the passengers handed the police an additional twelve knives, after which the police 
considered them to be "nonthreatening and cooperative." Id. The passengers were left to 
wait approximately 2 minutes for a K-9 unit to arrive. After the dog alerted on the 
vehicle the passengers were ordered out of the vehicle and were frisked. During that frisk 
the police discovered a marijuana pipe on the defendant. Id., at |^ 5. At a hearing the 
officer testified he was not frisking the defendant for officer safety. Id., at fflf 5-6. The 
defendant entered a conditional plea after his motion to suppress was denied. 
The court of appeals reversed the trial court, finding that at the point the police 
arrested the driver, the police should have released the rest of the passengers; and the 
police conducted the Terry frisk to search for contraband not weapons making it 
11 
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unreasonable. State v. Baker, 2008 UT App 115, fflf 13, 18, 182 P.3d 935. On certiorari 
review this Court considered whether the court of appeals erred in its determination "as to 
the permissible length and scope of the passengers in a vehicle that police have stopped," 
and whether the court of appeals erred as its decision relates to "circumstances under 
which searches for weapons may be concluded." Baker, 2010 UT 18, f^ 2. Applying the 
"two-step test to determine whether a traffic stop is reasonable" this court found the 
police were "justified at the inception of the stop to detain the vehicle [and all its 
passengers] to investigate the broken taillight" but found that the justified purpose of the 
stop ended when the drive was arrested. The dog sniff occurred after that point thus 
violating the Fourth Amendment. Id., at fflf 12-14. 
This Court found that although passengers are "lawfully detained until the officers 
have concluded all actions incident to the arrest of the driver", because "the police 
concluded all actions incident to the arrest of the driver when they detained Mr. Baker to 
await the arrival of the K-9 unit" the second prong was violated and the detention was 
unreasonable. Id., at % 15. Because the driver was arrested before she was placed in the 
police car (which was one minute before the K9 arrived) "the officers needed some 
reasonable articulable suspicion to lawfully detain Baker and the other passengers while 
awaiting the K-9 unit's arrival." Baker, 2008 UT App 115, f 13. 
The United State Supreme Court reviewed the case of Arizona v. Johnson, 555 
U.S. 323, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009) where several gang task force officers 
stopped an automobile for a registration violation but at the time of the stop, the officers 
had not reason to suspect the car's occupants of criminal activity. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 
12 
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327. While the first officer was questioning the driver about registration and insurance, 
one of the officers began questioning the defendant about gang activity because of the 
clothing and behavior. Johnson, at 328. The defendant was then asked to exit the vehicle 
to discuss his gang affiliation, away from the other passenger, and then was patted down 
for officer safety and the officer discovered a gun. Id, 
The relevant portion of the Supreme Court's opinion was cited by the court of 
appeals in this case below: "officers may pose questions to drivers and passengers 
unrelated to the scope of the stop without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, so 
long as those actions do not measurably extend the length of the stop" Simons, ^ 9 (citing 
Johnson, at 333). In Johnson, because the defendant was lawfully held by virtue of the 
traffic matter, and because his questioning, though unrelated to the stop, occurred before 
the justified stop was concluded, and because the officer had reasonable suspicion that 
the defendant may have been armed, the conviction was upheld and the passenger 
defendant's detention, questioning, and frisk were constitutionally reasonable. 
In State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650, this Court reversed the conviction 
of a defendant who had been pulled over on a routine traffic stop and been asked for 
consent to search his car. Originally, the defendant was pulled over because the officer 
observed an improper lane change and a computer check revealed the vehicle was 
uninsured. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, *[[ 6. When the officer approached car and explained 
the purpose of the stop, the defendant told the officer he could not afford insurance. The 
officer then took the driver's information, returned to the patrol car, and ran a computer 
check verifying the driver's license and a warrant check. Hansen, at ^ 8-9. The officer 
13 
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returned to the defendant's car and told him he could go with a warning but admonished 
him to obtain insurance. Id., at f 11. The officer then returned the defendant's license 
and registration and asked "if he had any alcohol, drugs or weapons in his vehicle" to 
which he responded, "No". Id., at fflf 12-13. The officer then asked for consent to search 
the vehicle even though he had "no reason to suspect Hansen of having any of these 
items" and the defendant apparently consented. Id., at ff 13-16. 
This Court applied the two part test (whether the stop was justified at its inception, 
and whether the detention reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified 
the detention in the first place) and found that while the traffic stop was justified at its 
inception by the traffic violation and insurance concern, asking the question and asking 
for consent after the traffic stop was concluded constituted an illegal seizure. Id., at ff 
30-31. In opposition to this finding the State alleged that the seizure had de-escalated to 
a consensual encounter by the time the officer asked about alcohol and drugs and claimed 
the defendant was free to leave and the further contact with the officer was not part of the 
detention. This Court disagreed and found that a reasonable person would not have felt 
the detention had de-escalated, that the purpose of the stop had concluded, or that he was 
free to leave. Id., at ffif 42-46. 
Most relevant to the case at hand was the factual circumstances, specifically the 
limited time it took, that led to a finding that the police had extended the scope of the 
defendant's detention. Hansen was returned his identification and given a warning, and 
then immediately asked whether or not he had alcohol or drugs in his vehicle and if he 
would mind having his car searched. That one question, although brief and temporally 
14 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
insignificant, represented an illegal extension of the scope of the detention significant 
enough to violate Hansen's right to be free from an unreasonable seizure. Id., at [^ 32 
("Officer Huntington extended the encounter by questioning Hansen about whether he 
had alcohol, drugs, or weapons in his vehicle and by asking if he could search his vehicle 
for these items"). 
In State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446 (Utah 1996), this Court reviewed a court of 
appeals decision upholding the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. At issue 
was whether the police reasonably detained the defendant and whether the extent of the 
detention exceeded to scope justified by reasonable suspicion. There, a police officer 
pulled into a school parking lot where he observed a vehicle parked late at night, in 
violation of a loitering ordinance. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 448-49. The officer 
approached the driver and the defendant, obtained their information and returned to the 
police car to run a warrant check. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 448. Although no warrants 
were found another officer who heard the name on the radio called the officer and warned 
him that the defendant was a gang member and known to carry a gun. Chapman, at 448. 
The officer, now with backup, approached the car, asked the defendant to step out, 
performed a weapons frisk and asked if he was armed. Eventually the defendant 
admitted there was a gun in the vehicle which the police discovered under the seat in a 
pack. The presence of the gun was not illegal. Id., at 448. The defendant was then 
arrested and a check was run on the weapon which revealed it was stolen and tied him to 
the burglary and theft. 
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This Court concluded that the officer had reasonable suspicion justifying the 
original detention because he observed the defendant potentially violating the loitering 
ordinance and the officer reasonably relied on the ordinance. Id., at 451-52. The Court 
also found that the officer's use of a warrant check was not an unreasonable extension of 
the detention. However, the Court found that if the disclosure about the weapon occurred 
after the defendant had been frisked and found to be unarmed the officers were no longer 
entitled to continue to question him about weapons, and if the disclosure about the 
weapon in the vehicle occurred while the frisk was being performed then further 
investigation into the status of the weapon was unreasonable once it was determined to 
have been carried lawfully. Id., at 453. "[W]e find that the officers impermissibly 
expanded the scope of their detention of Chapman when they additionally ran an NCIC 
check on the serial number of the gun..." after determining it was legally held. Id., at 
455. Again, as in Hansen, the legitimate purposes of the detention had concluded and the 
extension to run a computer check on the gun serial number, although likely very brief 
("shortly after discovering the gun" (Id., at 449)), constituted an extension significant 
enough to violate Chapman's right against unreasonable seizure. 
In sum, the foregoing case law and the cases upon which they are based, all 
relevant and apparently binding in this case, give the following holdings: 
Traffic stops and subsequent detentions are protected under the Fourth 
Amendment and are reviewed under a two prong approach. Courts first look at whether 
the police action to detain was justified at its inception, and then whether the detention 
following the stop was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the 
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interference in the first place. Baker, 2010 UT 18, % 12. "Once a traffic stop is made, the 
detention 'must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop.'" Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 
500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)). During a lawful traffic stop the temporary 
seizure of an automobile's passengers is reasonable and ordinarily continues to be 
reasonable for the duration of the stop. Baker, 2010 UT 18, \ 13. The investigation 
which takes place during the detention must be "strictly tied to and justified by' the 
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." Lopez, at 1132. If, during the 
course of the traffic stop, police officers develop probable cause to arrest the driver, the 
passengers may lawfully be detained until the arrest is complete. See Baker, 2010 UT 18, 
11116, 19. 
"An officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic 
stop... do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as 
those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop." See Arizona v. 
Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333, 129 S. Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009). Once the purpose 
of the stop is completed, however, those being detained must be released, an extension of 
mere seconds is an impermissible extension of the scope of a legitimate detention if not 
justified. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, % 32. Consent given during an illegally extended 
detention is invalid as an exploitation of that illegal detention. Hansen, at Tf 73. 
Even if the police have probable cause to arrest or cite for an offense, if they do 
not do so and begin investigating other areas, the continued detention must be justified by 
reasonable suspicion independent of the original purpose. Chapman, at 453 ("Continued 
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detention would be justified only if the officers had a reason, independent of the loitering 
ordinance, to do so."). 
Application 
The Utah Court of Appeals' decision is erroneous for two reasons. First, because 
the court found the police may extend a detention beyond the scope justified by 
reasonable suspicion so long as that extension does not "measurably extend the length of 
the traffic stop...", the court created a de minimus exception that has been rejected by 
this Court because the facts actually demonstrate the stop was measurably extended. 
Simons, at f^ 11. Second, the courts decision authorizes the police to delay the conclusion 
of a justified detention in order to investigate a passenger about whom the police have no 
independent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Each of these errors will be 
addressed in order. 
Deputy Luke measurably extended the length of the traffic stop and no de minimus 
exception exists. 
The opinion below seems to suggest that because it did not take long for Deputy 
Luke to walk around the car and ask Simons a question it did not "measurably extend the 
length of the traffic stop or render the overall duration of the stop unreasonable." Simons, 
2011 UT App 251, Tf 11. The decision relies on Johnson supporting this conclusion. But 
this reliance uses a seemingly relevant quote from the opinion but ignores the facts of 
Johnson, which render the quote much less applicable. It appears from the court of 
appeafs'6 opinion that, based on Johnson, an officer at a traffic stop can investigate 
anything, regardless of whether or not he has reason to believe anything other than a 
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traffic infraction has occurred, so long as the officer does so quickly. But the facts of 
Johnson reveal that the relative speed of the officer's off-topic inquiries are not the 
important factor, rather it is whether or not those being detained are being detained for 
any amount of time more than the reasonable suspicion justifies. 
The statement in Johnson cited by the court below, ("An officer's inquiries into 
matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop... do not convert the encounter 
into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably 
extend the duration of the stop"), must be viewed in light of the facts surrounding it. In 
Johnson, the detention was originally justified by a registration and insurance question. 
While one officer was dutifully attending to those matters two other officers began 
questioning the defendant and another passenger. Johnson, at 327-28. The officer who 
questioned the defendant had reason to suspect he may have been armed so she 
performed a frisk and then discovered a weapon. There was no extension under those 
facts because it appears that the legitimate purpose of the detention was ongoing with the 
primary officer while the secondary officers were asking questions of the passengers. 
Johnson would have been a very different case if there had been just one officer 
who began with the driver and partially investigated the suspected the insurance and 
registration matters and then decided to ask the defendant passenger whether or not he 
belonged to a gang. It seems clear that such a fact would have made all the difference in 
the world in Johnson. 
This case presents a much more significant extension, qualitatively, than that seen 
in Johnson. Here, Luke didn't have the assisting officer question Simons while he 
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continued to investigate and/or arrest the driver. Nor did Luke instruct the other officer 
to perform the field sobriety tests or place the driver under arrest. Rather, Luke ordered 
the driver out of the car and "had the assisting officer just stand by with Mr. Sorenson." 
R. 92: 25. The justified investigation stopped and from that point on, every measurable 
moment extended Simons'detention.6 
Thus, the facts of Johnson, and the distinction with the facts in this case, 
demonstrate that while the police may ask questions unrelated to the purpose of the stop 
and unjustified by reasonable suspicion, asking questions can measurably extend the 
duration of the stop and impact the legality of the detention. It is the circumstances that 
determine whether or not a measurable extension occurs, not the fact that the extension 
was merely a few questions or lasted only a few moments. When the Court in Johnson 
used the term measurable, it meant it. The term measurable was significant in Johnson 
because the defendant there could not say he was held one measurable second longer than 
was justified by reasonable suspicion. He was held for no longer than it took for the first 
officer to determine whether or not the car was insured and registered—and that justified 
6
 Johnson is also distinguishable from this case because the Court there found 
independent reasonable suspicion to detain and frisk the defendant, that of officer safety. 
Here, nothing in the record suggests that Deputy Luke stopped dealing with the driver, 
walked over to Simons, and started questioning him because he was afraid Simons might 
be armed or dangerous. In fact, Luke's testimony at the preliminary hearing was he 
approached Simons, informed him paraphernalia had been found "and asked him if he 
had anything on his person I needed to know about." R. 92: 8. The trial court's findings 
reflect this purpose as well. R. 48 ("In an effort to investigate suspicion that the 
occupants of the car may have recently used drugs... Deputy Luke questioned Mr. 
Simons, who was still in the vehicle."). 
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investigation was occurring while the second officer questioned the defendant. Thus, 
there was no measurable extension, because they were occurring at the same time. 
When Johnson is contrasted to the Utah cases of Hansen, Baker, and Chapman it 
becomes clear why this fact is so important. In Hansen, a few seconds, one question was 
measurable and enough to constitute an illegal extension where those few seconds were 
not justified by reasonable suspicion because it took place in addition to the time it took 
to deal with the underlying traffic offense. In Baker, the few moments the police 
continued to hold the defendant while waiting for a drug sniff dog constituted an illegal 
extension to an otherwise justified detention because it took place after the completion of 
the arrest of the driver. In Chapman, the few moments it took to run a computer check on 
the gun constituted an illegal extension to the otherwise justified detention because the 
police should have either arrested him, cited him or let him go and not begun looking for 
evidence of other illegal behavior. Each of these examples was a measurable extension, 
not because they lasted a significant amount of time, but because the time they did take 
was in addition to the time it took to investigate the matters which were justified by 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause. 
There is no de minimus exception when it comes to measurably extending an 
investigative detention, and the court of appeals' reliance on such an exception is 
erroneous. A few seconds, one question, is measurable and enough to constitute an 
illegal extension where those few seconds are not justified by reasonable suspicion. As 
we see in these cases, any amount of time can be a measurable extension, the principle of 
measurability it is not about the length of the extension but about whether or not the 
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person should be detained at that moment. Here, there is no question that the police 
measurably extended the scope and duration of Simons' detention, even though it may 
have not been for long, when Deputy Luke stopped investigating the driver and started 
investigation Simons. 
The decision below notes the Baker decision for the principle that courts should 
not "micromanage the details of a traffic stop to ensure that no actions of the police 
improperly extend the stop so long as the duration of the stop is reasonable under the 
totality of the circumstances." Simons, 2011 UT251,f 10 {quoting Baker, 2010 UT 18, \ 
17). But that citation to Baker is also misplaced because it ignores the facts in Baker. 
The question in Baker, as here, was not about whether or not a detention was too long. 
The relevant question in both cases is what the police do with the time they while they 
are seizing people, and about making sure that the use of that constitutionally protected 
time is reasonable (i.e. justified by reasonable suspicion). In Baker this Court found error 
in the conduct of the police not because they performed one necessary duty out of order, 
like asked for a drivers license before informing the driver why she was stopped, or 
because the officers took too long filling out the paperwork. Rather, the error in Baker 
was that the police were investigating and searching a passenger during a time when that 
passenger should have been released. The finding of this Court did not micromanage the 
police by finding that they could not search the defendant after the lawful purpose of the 
stop had concluded. Rather, that finding was a reiteration of long held constitutional law: 
the police have to have reasonable suspicion to seize a person and investigate them and 
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when the police go beyond that reasonable suspicion a suspect's Fourth Amendment 
rights are violated. 
The same is true here. The court of appeals was wrong to consider the appeal 
below a request to micromanage the police in their minute-to-minute police work. A 
finding that Luke extended the scope of the stop is the opposite of micromanaging, it is 
macro-managing by telling the police that regardless of how you do your job minute-to-
minute, you are not allowed to perform investigations upon people who are detained 
unless those investigations are supported by reasonable suspicion (subject to the im-
measurable exception demonstrated in Johnson), especially when those people are 
detained based on the reasonable suspicion upon another person. 
The circumstances in Chapman should be informative on this point as well. The 
defendant there was reasonably detained for a violation of the loitering ordinance but he 
was never cited or arrested for it. After the police returned from the warrants check they 
"were required to either arrest [him], issue him a citation, or release him." Chapman, at 
453. Because they did not do any of these things the subsequent detention and 
investigation had to be justified by something other than the original evidence related to 
the loitering. By finding the continued detention and investigation illegal in Chapman 
this Court did not micromanage the police, it reasserted the point of the investigative 
detention doctrine which is if you have reasonable suspicion investigate it, if you have 
probable cause make an arrest or citation; get on with it and don't abuse the power to 
detain someone in order to fish around for crimes not justified by evidence. 
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The same is true here, Simons' detention was originally justified by the traffic 
violations of the driver, and by the subsequent discovery of evidence related to the 
driver's possible DUI and possession of drug paraphernalia. When the police found 
evidence of the driver's possible intoxication they could have cited him, investigated 
further by performing sobriety tests, or let them both go. When the police discovered the 
paraphernalia they could have either arrested the driver (during which time Simons would 
be lawfully detained), cited him, or let them both go. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 
U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (when considering the length of an 
investigative stop it is appropriate to examine "whether the police diligently pursued a 
means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly..."). 
But the police did not do anything to conclude the detention or dispel their suspicion as to 
the driver's criminal conduct. R. 92: 25. Rather, Luke stopped dealing with the driver 
and began investigating Simons about whom he had no reasonable suspicion, and from 
that point on, Simons' detention needed to be justified by something other than the 
evidence related to the traffic offenses, the potential DUI, or the paraphernalia for which 
the police had stopped investigating. 
In conclusion, no de minimus exception exists and the court of appeals' 
application of the 'measurable extension" rule improperly creates one. 
The holding below gives the police an incentive to postpone concluding a justified 
detention in order to investigate other unsupported suspicions. 
As alleged in Simons' petition, another problem with the court of appeals' 
decision is that it the decision from the court of appeals below, combined with this 
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Court's holdings in Baker and Hansen, give the police an incentive not to "diligently 
pursue[] a means of investigation that [is] likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions 
quickly" because it seems that brief unrelated extensions that occur prior to the 
conclusion of an arrest or citation are constitutional (as per Simons), but similar brief 
unrelated extensions that occur immediately following the conclusion of an arrest or 
citation are not (as per Baker and Hansen). Now, when the police are faced with a desire 
to request a search or to investigate a hunch not supported by reasonable suspicion upon 
those who are otherwise lawfully detained they will undoubtedly chose to postpone the 
conclusion of the justified stop in order to investigate those hunches rather than choose to 
wait until after the conclusion of the justified detention. 
Simons asserts that such a precedent is at odds not only with the constitution and 
the cases but also with sound public policy. Rather, the cases interpreting the 
reasonableness requirements of the Fourth Amendment should encourage the police to 
respect the public's right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure (i.e. seizure and 
investigation unsupported by reasonable suspicion) to the greatest extent possible while 
not infringing on the police's duty to investigate crime where evidence suggests it may 
be. 
If the position of the court of appeals is upheld then the police would be able to, 
and encouraged to, delay the conclusion of a detention of passengers (many of who are 
only being held by the justification of the traffic violations of the driver) in order to 
investigate those passengers on matters unsupported by any suspicion so that the 
investigation occurs before concluding the stop. This cannot be what this Court intended 
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to create when it found "[a]ny further temporary detention for investigative questioning 
after fulfilling the purpose for the initial traffic stop constitutes an illegal seizure..." 
Hansen, at f^ 31. Therefore, the decision below of the court of appeals erroneously 
applies the precedent of this Court and the United States Supreme Court. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
In conclusion, the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's 
denial of the motion to suppress was an error because it created a de minimus exception 
to the measurable extension rule contrairy to the case law of this Court, and because it 
authorizes the police to postpone the conclusion of otherwise legitimate detentions in 
order to investigate matters not supported by reasonable suspicion. Petitioner now asks 
this Court to reverse the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals and remand this case to 
the District Court with order allowing Simons to withdraw his plea and suppressing any 
evidence discovered as a result of his illegal detention. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ day of /\f£tL , 2012. 
Douglas Q. Thompson 
Attorney for Petitioner/Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I herby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of 
Petitioner/Defendant postage prepaid to the Utah State Attorney General, Appeals 
Division, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 on 
the JP day of /ifiS/L , 2012. 
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THOMAS H. MEANS (2222) 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
Attorneys for Defendant 
51 South University Avenue 
Suite 206 
Provo, Utah, 84601 
Telephone (801) 852-1070 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MILO SIMONS, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
and REQUEST FOR HEARING 
Case No. 061404283 
Judge James R. Taylor 
MOTION 
Comes Now, Defendant, Miio Simons, by and through his attorney of record, 
Thomas H. Means, and pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
who hereby submits this Motion to Suppress all evidence derived as a result of the 
search of his person by officers of the Utah County Sheriff Department on or about 21 
October, 2006 in Utah County. Support for this Motion is more particularly set forth in 
the accompanying Memorandum of points and authority. 
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MEMORANDUM 
A. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
(This statement of facts is derived from the transcript of the preliminary examination 
conducted in this matter on 7 December, 2006, which has been made a part of this 
Court's file.) 
1. On 21 October, 2006 Deputy Utah County Sheriff, John Rockwell Luke, along 
with an unnamed officer whom he was training, was patrolling roads in Utah County. On 
State Road 77 he observed a vehicle traveling 60 MPH in a 50 MPH zone. He also 
noted that the State's computers listed the vehicle as not currently insured. He paced 
the vehicle and noted that it didn't slow to comply with the speed limit. He then stopped 
the vehicle for the observed traffic violation. [Transcript page 3 line 1 through page 5 
line 5] 
2. Sheriff Luke originally approached the vehicle on the passenger's side while 
the other officer approached the driver's side. Kevin Sorenson was driving and Milo 
Simons was in the front passenger seat. Sheriff Luke had no conversation with Simons 
but simply observed through the passenger door window. After this initial approach, 
Sheriff Luke and the other officer met at the rear of the stopped vehicle for a moment 
and Sheriff Luke then approached the driver's side window where he observed that 
Keven Sorenson showed signs of possible impairment. Sheriff Luke returned to his 
patrol vehicle to run records checks and continued to observe Sorenson as he did so. 
When Sheriff Luke returned to the driver's window he asked Sorenson to exit from the 
vehicle so that fiefd sobriety tests could be conducted. As he opened the driver's door to 
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allow Sorenson to exit, Sheriff Luke observed, in the pocket of the driver's door handle, 
several small plastic baggies that had been chewed. The baggies appeared to have 
white crystal powdery residue in them. [Tr. 5:6 - 8:21; 22:1-25:14; 27:14-28:7] 
3. Sheriff Luke next had the other officer stand with Sorenson and immediately 
approached Simons and asked if Simons had anything on him that the Sheriff should 
know about. Simons responded that he had a pipe in his underwear which the Luke 
had Simons shake out of his panf s leg. [Tr. 8:22-9:23; 25:15-25] 
4. Sorenson was then searched more thoroughly during which $561 in cash and 
more possible methamphetamine was recovered from a satchel within Sorenson's coat 
pocket. [Tr. 10:3-11:21] 
5. Then Simons was more thoroughly searched and a baggie of suspected 
methamphetamine was found in Simon's pant's pocket. [Tr. 11:22-12:25] 
6. Upon finding the baggies in Sorenson's door handle pocket, Luke decided not 
to conduct field sobriety tests. [Tr.26:18-27:3] 
7. Sheriff Luke testified that while he could have arrested Sorenson for 
possession of the paraphernalia discovered in the door handle pocket, he did not do so 
because "That's a charge that we would issue a citation for and release." [Tr. 26:1-17] 
B. ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that his warrantless seizure and the resultant warrantless 
search of his person went beyond the permissible scope allowed by the principles 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, 
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Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. Further, under the exclusionary rules established 
by the Utah Supreme Court, all the evidence and statements obtained due to the illegal 
detention and search must be suppressed. Specifically, Simons argues that while the 
initial stop of the vehicle in which he was a passenger for a traffic violation may have 
been justified, the scope of that stop was illegally extended as to him because no 
reasonable suspicion supported a rational conclusion that Simons had committed a 
crime, notwithstanding that evidence did support a reasonable suspicion that Sorenson 
may have committed one or more crimes. 
1. Simons was legally detained, initially: 
"When an officer stops a vehicle for a traffic violation, he may briefly detain the 
vehicle and its occupants while he examines the vehicle registration and the driver's 
license." State v. Schlosser, 114 P.2d 1132,1135 (Utah 1989) (citing Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 59 L Ed. 2d 660 (1979)). When Sheriff Luke 
observed Sorenson speeding, reasonable suspicion existed to justify detaining both 
Sorenson and his passenger Simons for the observed traffic violation. 
2. The detention of Simons was unjustifiably extended bevond that which was 
necessary to deal with Sorenson's possible criminal activity: 
The length and scope of any detention must be "'strictly tied to and justified by1 
the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
19-20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L. Ed. 2d 88», 9m^m8). In order to seize or search 
an individual, the police must have a belief of guilt that is "particularized with respect to 
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the person to be searched or seized". Ybarra v Illinois, 444 US 85,91 (1979). "[A] 
person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does 
not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person." Sibron v New 
York, 392 US 40, 62-63 (1968). 
In the course of dealing with Sorenson's traffic violation, Sheriff Luke legitimately 
developed additional information that Sorenson may have been driving impaired and 
that Sorenson may have been in illegal possession of drug paraphernalia. At that point, 
Simons' further detention to facilitate Luke's investigation of Sorenson was justified. But, 
rather than further pursue a DUI investigation or issue Sorenson a citation for the 
speeding and paraphernalia, and without any information specific to Simons, Luke 
stopped dealing with Sorenson and immediately turned to question Simons about 
"anything on his person [Luke] need[ed] to know about." Such questioning, without a 
rational basis to suspect Simons was in possession of contraband, exceeded the 
legitimate scope of the initial automobile stop. State v Hansen, 63 P,3d 650 (Utah, 
2002) 1f32. Consequently, at the point that Luke approached Simons to question him 
about drugs, based on facts associated with Sorenson, Simon's previous legal detention 
as a passenger in Sorenson's car was illegally extended. The scope of the otherwise 
legal detention was illegally expanded. State v Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127,1131-32 (Utah, 
1994).. 
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3. Simons' cooperation was not attenuated from his illegal seizure: 
After finding Sorenson's paraphernalia, Sheriff Luke approached Simons asking if 
he was in possession of anything illegal. Simons responded that he possessed a pipe. 
Later, after searching Sorenson more thoroughly, Luke again approached Simons who 
told him he possessed methamphetamine. It might be argued that Simons consented to 
a search when he first volunteered the pipe and later a baggie of methamphetamine. 
However, "[w]hen police illegally detain an individual, evidence obtained during a 
subsequent search may nevertheless be admitted if the person gave valid consent to 
the search." Hansen, supra, at fl47, citing to State v Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1262 
(Utah, 1993), citing to State v Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah, 1990). A consent can 
be valid only if "(1) [t]he consent was given voluntarily, and (2) the consent was not 
obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality." Hansen, supra. 
a. Consent: 
Consent must be determined from the totality of the circumstances. Sfafe v 
Durrand, 569 P.2d 1107, 1108-09 (Utah, 1977). Although Sheriff Luke described 
Simons as "cooperative" it is far from clear that Simons was asked for or explicitly 
consented to either of the two searches. One might cooperate with what he perceives to 
be an order without agreeing with or consenting to the perceived order. 
In this case being already detained by two police officers, on a remote county 
road, and presumably aware that the officers had discovered that his companion was in 
possession of drug paraphernalia, Simons was approached by one of the officers and 
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asked if he possessed anything illegal. Strictly speaking, Luke did not seek permission 
to search Simons, His statement to Simons could be characterized as meaning "may I 
look to see if you have anything illegal?" But, it might just as equally be characterized as 
meaning "show me what you have in your pockets!" Simons argues that in the totality of 
the circumstances, his responses to Luke's two statement were cooperative compliance 
with what he perceived as orders and not as consent to Luke's requests. 
b. Voluntariness: 
"When the State attempts to prove that there was voluntary consent after an 
illegal detention, it' "has a much heavier burden to satisfy than when"' consent is given 
after a permissible detention." Hansen, supra, at TJ51, citing to Arroyo, supra, at 687-88, 
citing to United States v Melendez-Gonzalez, 727 F.2d 407, 414 (%th CirM 1984). The 
State must prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence on the totality of the 
circumstances. Hansen, supra, at fl56. Courts should scrutinize both the details of the 
detention and the characteristics of the defendant. Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 
218, at 226, 248(1973). 
Assuming, but not conceding, that Simons did consent to the two searches, he 
argues that his consent was not voluntary. In this situation Schneckloth factors include 
a) the presence of two officers, b) the location on a remote county road, c) the officers 
did not explicitly claim a right to search Simons nor show overt force nor use deception 
or trick, yet Luke's ambiguous statement implied he expected Simons to divulge what 
he possessed, d) as noted, Luke didn't clearly seek permission to search, e) Simons 
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didn't clearly and unequivocally grant consent, f) Simons did not have a meaningful 
opportunity to consider Luke's "request". Weighed in light of the State's "heavier burden" 
to prove consent, Simons argues that his consent, if any, cannot be determined 
voluntary. 
c. Exploitation: 
"Evidence obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality is tainted by the 
violation of a person's constitutional rights". Hansen, supra, at 1J62, citing to Mapp v 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). Courts are to evaluate the police misconduct and use 
the sanction of suppression in an attempt to deter future constitutional violations. State v 
Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah, 1995). The United States Supreme Court has 
recognized three factors critical to this analysis: 1) the purpose and flagrancy of the 
illegal conduct, 2) the presence of intervening circumstances, and 3) temporal proximity 
between the misconduct and the consent. Brown v Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599-600 
(1975). 
Simons has argued hereinabove that he wasn't asked for and didn't consent to a 
search of his person and that his actions, while cooperative, were not voluntary. Even 
assuming Simons voluntarily consented to the two searches, each search was an 
exploitation of his illegal detention and the yield from each search should therefore be 
suppressed. 
> ^ 27 
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i- Purpose and flagrancy: 
"Where the purpose of the illegal conduct is to obtain consent, suppressing 
evidence derived from the illegal conduct 'clearly will have a deterrents effect/ " 
Hansen, supra, at 1J65, citing to Thurman, at 1264. Here, Luke could have had no 
purpose other than seeking consent to also search Simons when, after finding 
paraphernalia on Sorenson, he approached Simons and immediately questioned him 
about his possessing "anything illegal". Therefore the seeking of consent was directly 
tied to and a product of the illegal detention of Simon and suppression would have a 
deterrents effect on future similar police action. 
ii. Intervening circumstances: 
"Intervening circumstances may include such events as an officer telling a person 
he or she has a right to refuse consent or to consult with an attorney." United States v 
McKines, 993 F.2d 1412, 1430 (*th dr., 1991). Luke did not advise Simons he did not 
have to consent or that he could consult with an attorney. Simons didn't consult with any 
other person before submitting to the searches. It appears there were no circumstances 
that intervened between Luke's statements to Simons and Simons submissions to the 
searches. 
iii. Temporal proximity: 
"A brief time lapse between a Fourth Amendment violation and consent often 
indicates exploitation because the effects of the misconduct have not had time to 
dissipate." Shoulderblade, at 293, citing to United States v Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 
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1046,1055 (10th Cir., 1994). There was practically no time lapse whatsoever between 
the moment of Simons' detention, the statement from Luke and Simons' compliance. 
Simons was detained illegally at the instant that Luke asked him the question; Simons 
complied almost immediately. The detention and seeking of consent (if that's what it 
was) occurred simultaneously; Simons complied with almost no delay. Everything 
happened essentially at the same time. 
4. Conclusion: 
Simons was illegally obtained. He did not consent to either search of his person. 
Assuming Simons consented to either search, his consent was not voluntary in either 
instance. Notwithstanding consent or voluntariness, Sheriff Luke exploited the illegal 
detention of Simons to gain his consent. All evidence derived as a result of the two 
searches of Simons should be suppressed. 
5. Relief Sought: 
The United States Supreme Court has long held that illegally obtained evidence is 
inadmissible through operation of the exclusionary rule. Weeks v. United States, 232 
U.S. 383, 398 (1914). Further, the Utah Supreme Court has upheld application of the 
rule with reference to the federal and state constitution: 
Implicit in, but fundamental to, this court's treatment of the legal 
issue in Louden, Montavne. Criscola. Kent, and other cases is the 
principle that if evidence used against the defendant had been found to 
have been acquired in violation of constitutional guarantees, its exclusion 
would be inevitably required.... We now expressly hold that exclusion of 
illegally obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police violations 
of article I, section 14. Larocco, 794 P.2d at 471 (emphasis added). 
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Because both the seizure and search of Simons were warrantless, each was per 
se invalid and it is the State's burden to establish a legal exception to the warrant 
requirement of both the federal a state constitutions. Katz v United States, 389 US 347 
(1967); State v Christensen, 676 P.2d 408 (Utah, 1984). 
As this Memorandum establishes that the detention and search of Simons' 
person in this case was conducted in violation of his right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures as guaranteed by both the constitutions of the United States and 
of Utah, and because any consent determined to have been granted by Simons was the 
result of police exploitation of his illegal detention, the exclusionary rule should bar the 
admission of all evidence derived as a result of the seizure and/or search. 
P. Request for hearing 
Should this Court not grant the relief sought herein, Defendant respectfully 
requests that a hearing be set for this Court to take further evidence material to this 
Motion. 
Dated this £*> day of March, 2007. 
Thofoias H. Means 
Attorney for Defendant 
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FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Uiaj* County^State of Utah 
Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
State of Utah : 
Plaintiff : Minute Entry 
vs. : Date: 
Kevin Sorensen, : Case Number: 061404282 
Milo B. Simons 061404283 ' 
Defendants : Division VII: Judge James R. Taylor 
This matter comes before the Court upon the motion of each of the Defendants to 
suppress evidence seized at the time of their arrest. For the reasons explained below the motions 
are denied. 
The State and both Defendants indicated to the Court that they wished to submit the 
motions upon the facts as elicited during the preliminary hearing. This Court conducted the 
hearing and has a transcript of the testimony. 
On October 21st, 2006 at an undetermined time of day Deputy Sheriff John Rockwell 
Luke was patrolling on SR 77 in Utah County with trainee officer Dan Thomas. They observed a 
vehicle traveling at a steady 10 miles per hour above the posted speed limit. The license plate 
was reported to dispatch who informed the deputies that records available to them indicated the 
vehicle to be uninsured. The officers made a traffic stop. Deputy Luke first went to the 
passenger side of the vehicle where he observed Defendant Simons in the front passenger seat, 
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The trainee deputy went to the driver's door. After a brief exchange the deputies met behind the 
vehicle and then Deputy Luke approached the driver, Defendant Sorensen. The reason for this 
procedure was that the trainee, Deputy Thomas, was being given experience in the stop and 
approach but it was determined that if a citation were to be given Deputy Luke would be the 
citing officer. Deputy Luke confirmed that Mr. Sorensen could not provide proof of insurance 
for the vehicle. 
During this exchange Deputy Luke observed what he considered to be signs of 
impairment. These signs included watery, bloodshot eyes; rapid speech and movement and 
agitated, rapid body movement. The deputy felt that the unusual body language indicated 
possible intoxication or impairment. He stepped back to check records on the suspects and then 
re-approached the driver's side of the car. Mr. Sorensen, not in response to any question or 
comment, blurted out that he was not drunk and, forcing his face toward the window, asked the 
officer to look in his eyes. 
From these observations the deputy concluded that he had a suspicion Mr. Sorensen was 
driving while impaired. In order to continue investigation of that suspicion he directed Mr. 
Sorensen to get out of the vehicle. When the door was opened he observed in plain view in the 
door compartment two used corners or fragments of baggies which were consistent with the 
storage and use of controlled substances. In an effort to investigate a suspicion that the 
occupants of the car may have recently used drugs the training deputy was directed to stay with 
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Mr. Sorensen while Deputy Luke questioned Mr. Simons, who was still in the vehicle. He told 
Mr. Simons he had found paraphernalia in the car and asked if he had anything on his person thatt 
he needed to know about. Mr. Simons immediately told him that he had a pipe in his underwear. 
Mr. Simons then stepped out of the vehicle at the deputy's direction. A pipe fell to the ground 
out of his right pant leg. Both Defendants were then searched and methamphetamine was located 
a small sack or satchel in Mr. Sorensen's left coat pocket and, also, in a small pants pocket of 
Mr. Simons* 
It is well established in Utah that an officer may stop a vehicle for an offense committed 
in his presence. Indeed, in this case neither defendant challenges the propriety of the initial 
traffic stop. A traffic stop is a level two encounter, which may be based upon reasonable 
suspicion. Officers may conduct a reasonable investigation suggested by such a suspicion. 
In this case Deputy Luke's initial suspicion of driving while impaired was quickly 
supplemented by his observation of drug paraphernalia in plain sight when the car door was 
properly opened to remove Mr. Sorensen to investigate the possible DUI charge. The baggies 
were not only strongly likely to be paraphernalia, the used condition implied use of the drugs 
they might have contained. That suspicion coupled with the signs of possible impairment lead to 
a reasonable suspicion and concern about both occupants of the car. The tactics including 
a quick search of Mr. Sorensen's person and questioning Mr. Simons about drug possession or 
use, followed by a search of his person (perhaps a bit of an overstatement since the search 
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consisted of having him step and literally shake a leg so the paraphernalia slipped down his pant 
leg to be recovered by the officer) were reasonably suggested by his concerns. Once it was 
confirmed that Mr. Simons was in possession of drug paraphernalia, arrest and a further, 
concurrent search of his person was justified. Consent of either Defendant to the search was 
irrelevant and this Court makes no finding on that point 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
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State v. Sorensen, Simons 061404283,06A404282 Ruling 4/27/07 
Copies of this Order mailed to: 
Counsel for the Plaintiff: 
Utah County Attorney, hand delivered 
Counsel for the Defendant: 
Kevin Sorensen: Thomas Means, Utah County Public Defender, hand delivered 
Milo Simons: Shelden R. Carter 
3325 North University, Suite 200 
Ppvo, Utah 84604-4438 
Mailed this/ £> day o f A 4 , 2007, postage pre-paid as noted above. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
— 0 0 O 0 0 — 
State of Utah, ) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ) Case No. 20080109-CA 
v. ) F I L E D 
) (July 29, 2011) 
Milo Simons, ) 
) 1 2011 UTApp 251 1 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
Fourth District, Provo Department, 061404283 
The Honorable James R. Taylor 
Attorneys: Douglas J. Thompson, Provo, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeffrey S. Gray, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges McHugh, Roth, and Christiansen. 
McHUGH, Associate Presiding Judge: 
11 Milo Simons appeals from his conviction for possession of methamphetamine, a 
third degree felony, see Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2010),1 arguing that a 
police officer violated his Fourth Amendment rights by impernussibly extending the 
length of a traffic stop without reasonable suspicion. We affirm. 
because the relevant sections of the code have not changed, we cite to the 
current version as a convenience to the reader. 
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12 On the evening of October 21, 2006, Deputy John Luke was on patrol near 
Springville, Utah, with another officer whom he was training when he observed a 
vehicle traveling approximately ten miles per hour over the posted speed limit. After a 
computer check revealed that the vehicle was also uninsured, Deputy Luke initiated a 
traffic stop. The officer-in-training made initial contact with the vehicle's driver. 
During this initial encounter, Deputy Luke approached the vehicle from the passenger 
side to observe the exchange. Simons was sitting in the front passenger seat, but 
Deputy Luke did not speak with him at the time. The officers then met behind the 
vehicle. After a brief exchange between the officers, Deputy Luke approached the 
driver, as Deputy Luke would be the one actually issuing the citation if it were 
determined that a citation was appropriate. Deputy Luke requested the driver's license, 
registration, and proof of insurance. The driver explained that the vehicle was 
borrowed and that he was unable to provide proof of insurance. 
13 Deputy Luke testified at the preliminary hearing that at this point, he observed 
signs of possible impairment in the driver, including watery, bloodshot eyes, and rapid 
speech and movement. Deputy Luke continued to observe "agitated" movements in 
the driver after he went back to his patrol car to conduct a records check. When he 
again approached the driver after conducting the records check, the driver "blurted out 
. . . without being questioned" that he was not drunk, told Deputy Luke to "look at [his] 
eyes," and "forced his face towards the window." Deputy Luke asked the driver to step 
out of the vehicle because he wanted to conduct field sobriety tests. As the driver 
stepped out of the vehicle, Deputy Luke observed, in the driver's side door 
compartment, "several baggies that had been chewed on." Deputy Luke testified that 
in his experience, he had only ever seen these types of baggies used to carry drugs and 
he noticed "white powder of a small crystal residue inside" the baggies, which he 
suspected was methamphetamine. 
14 Deputy Luke testified that after he found the baggies, he "had the assisting 
officer iust stand bv with Tthe driver!" while he approached Simons, who was still 
sitting in the passenger seat. He explained to Simons that he had found paraphernalia 
in the car and asked Simons if there was "anything on his person [Deputy Luke] 
need[ed] to know about." Simons immediately confessed to having a pipe in his 
underwear. Deputy Luke then had Simons step out of the vehicle and shake the pipe 
out of his pants, where it fell to the ground. After the officers searched the driver and 
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placed him under arrest, Simons informed Deputy Luke that he also had 
methamphetamine in his pocket.2 
15 Simons was charged with possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor, see id. § 58-37a-5(l), and possession of a controlled substance, a second 
degree felony, see id. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). Simons was bound over for trial following a 
preliminary hearing. Before trial, he filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the pipe 
and methamphetamine, arguing that it was obtained in violation of his rights against 
unreasonable search and seizure pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, see U.S. Const, amend. IV.3 The trial court denied Simons's motion, 
concluding that the used condition of the baggies "coupled with the possible 
impairment [of the driver] le[d] to a reasonable suspicion and concern about both 
occupants of the car." Folio wing the trial court's denial of his motion, Simons entered a 
conditional guilty plea to the charge of possession of a controlled substance,4 reserving 
his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, see State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 
939 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
%6 Simons appeals, arguing that the evidence in this case should be suppressed 
because Deputy Luke exceeded the permissible length and scope of the stop when, 
2Deputy Luke retrieved the bag from Simons's pocket and he testified that the 
bag's contents were subsequently tested and identified as methamphetamine. 
3Simons also cites article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution in arguing that 
Deputy Luke's actions violated his rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
However, because he has not argued for a separate analysis under the Utah 
Constitution, we consider only Simons's federal constitutional claim. See State v. Bean, 
869 P.2d 984, 988 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("[A]n appellate court can decline to address 
state constitutional claims under article I, section 14 if the party fails to proffer any 
explanation as to how this court's analysis should differ under this section from the 
federal counterpart." (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV. 
4In exchange for pleading guilty to possession of a controlled substance, the State 
agreed to dismiss the charge against Simons for possession of drug paraphernalia. 
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without reasonable suspicion that Simons was engaged in any criminal activity, he 
turned his attention from the driver to Simons and asked Simons if he had "anything on 
his person [Deputy Luke] need[ed] to know about." When reviewing a trial court's 
denial of a motion to suppress, we review the findings of fact under a clearly erroneous 
standard, see State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, f 12,164 R3d 397, and its legal conclusions 
for correctness, see State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, J 7, 229 P.3d 650. '"When a case involves 
the reasonableness of a search and seizure, we afford little discretion to the district court 
because there must be state-wide standards that guide law enforcement and 
prosecutorial officials.'" Id. (quoting State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, \ 12, 78 P.3d 590). 
Because we conclude that Deputy Luke did not exceed the permissible length of the 
stop, we need not determine whether Deputy Luke's questioning of Simons was 
supported by reasonable suspicion. See Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, \ 13, 52 P.3d 1158 
("[A]n appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any 
legal ground or theory apparent on the record." (emphasis and internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
\7 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens from 
"unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const, amend. IV. "Although police must 
have a warrant to conduct most searches and seizures, 'officers may temporarily detain 
a vehicle and its occupants upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity for the 
purpose of conducting a limited investigation of the suspicion/" Baker, 2010 UT 18, \ 11 
(quoting State v. James, 2000 UT 80, f 10,13 P.3d 576). Although "'one does not lose the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment while in an automobile/" id. (additional internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127,1131 (Utah 1994)), the 
"'automobile exception' to the warrant rule arises because occupants of a vehicle have a 
lesser expectation of privacy 'due to the mobile nature of vehicles and their highly 
regulated status,'" id. (quoting James, 2000 UT 80, J 10). 
^8 In order to determine whether a traffic stop is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment we apply a two-step test. See id. % 12. "The first step is to determine 
whether the police officer's action [was] justified at its inception. In the second step, we 
must determine whether the detention following the stop was reasonably related in 
scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place." Id. 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Simons concedes that 
Deputy Luke was justified in pulling the vehicle over for a speeding violation. See 
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 ("[A] police officer is constitutionally justified in stopping a 
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vehicle if the stop is incident to a traffic violation committed in the officer's presence." 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). We now address Simons's contention that Deputy 
Luke's conduct exceeded the scope of the traffic stop here. 
19 For the duration of a lawful traffic stop, "'[t]he temporary seizure of driver and 
passengers ordinarily continues, and remains reasonable, for the duration of the stop.'" 
Baker, 2010 U T 1 8 , f 1 3 (quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 788 (2009)). Unless 
the officer forms new reasonable articulable suspicion or probable cause of further 
criminal activity during the course of the traffic stop, "the officer must allow the seized 
person to depart once the purpose of the stop has concluded." Id.; see also State v. 
Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 31, 63 P.3d 650 ("Any further temporary detention for 
investigative questioning after [fulfilling] the purpose for the initial traffic stop 
constitutes an illegal seizure, unless an officer has probable cause or a reasonable 
suspicion of a further illegality." (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). If, during the course of the traffic stop, police officers develop probable cause 
to arrest the driver, the passengers may lawfully be detained until the arrest is 
complete. See Baker, 2010 UT 18, H 16,19. "At that time, officers must release any 
passengers who were detained incident to the detention of the vehicle." Id. % 19. 
^10 During the course of an otherwise lawful encounter, however, officers may pose 
questions to drivers and passengers unrelated to the scope of the stop without 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, so long as those actions do not measurably 
extend the length of the stop. See Johnson, 129 S. Ct. at 788 ("An officer's inquiries into 
matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop . . . do not convert the encounter 
into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably 
extend the duration of the stop."). In making the determination of whether the stop has 
been measurably extended, "[a] court should not micromanage the details of a traffic 
stop to ensure that no actions of the police improperly extend the stop so long as the 
duration of the stop is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances." Baker, 2010 
UT 18,117. Instead, "[t]he reasonableness of a detention should be evaluated on the 
basis of the totality of the circumstances facing the officer, not on judicial second-
guessing." Worwood, 2007 UT 47 , f 28. 
I l l Although Simons concedes that Deputy Luke was entitled to detain him while 
investigating his reasonable suspicion that the driver was intoxicated and in possession 
of the residue-filled baggies, Simons contends that Deputy Luke impermissibly 
expanded the length of the stop when he ceased investigating the driver to approach 
20080109-CA 5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and question Simons. We disagree. While the record is unclear on the exact time it took 
for Deputy Luke to approach Simons, it indicates that Deputy Luke walked 
immediately from the driver's side to the passenger side and asked Simons if he had 
anything on his person that the officer should know about. In response to that single 
question, Simons immediately revealed that he had a pipe in his underwear. Under 
these circumstances, we are convinced that the question did not measurably extend the . 
length of the traffic stop or render the overall duration of the stop unreasonable. See 
Johnson, 129 S. Ct. at 787-88 (concluding that questions directed to a passenger during a 
traffic stop designed to assess possible gang membership were not part of a consensual 
encounter, but also acknowledging that "[a]n officer's inquiries into matters unrelated 
to the justification for the traffic stop . . . do not convert the encounter into something 
other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the 
duration of the stop"); see also State v. Wilkinson, 2008 UT App 395, f 9,197 P.3d 96 
(concluding that an officer's request for a canine unit, in the absence of reasonable 
suspicion, did not impermissibly expand the scope or duration of a passenger's 
detention, because to conclude that any deviation from the purpose of the stop 
constitutes an illegal seizure "would place untenable demands on officers on the 
street"). Therefore, we affirm the denial of Simons's motion to suppress. 
<I[12 Affirmed. 
Carolyn B. McHugh, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
f 13 WE CONCUR: 
Stephen L. Roth, Judge 
Michele M. Christiansen, Judge 
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